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I. INTRODUCTION: AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE? A FRESH START?
On March 29, 2017, the United Kingdom began leaving the European
Union by giving formal notice under Article 50 of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union (the so-called Brexit).1 This has immersed the U.K. government
and E.U. Institutions in negotiations to disentangle the United Kingdom
from E.U. law by the end of March 2019—barring any extension—and to
devise a new legal framework for U.K.-E.U. trade.2 The United Kingdom
will also need to adjust its trading arrangements with the rest of the
world. In this context, public procurement regulation is broadly seen as an
area where, “unshackle[d]” from E.U. law, the United Kingdom would be
able to turn to a lighter-touch and more commercially oriented regulatory
regime.3 This poses a unique set of questions and difficulties from an inter-
national trade law perspective. The United Kingdom is the first member
state to leave the European Union’s single market and the ever-thicker net-
work of international trade deals the European Union has entered into on
behalf of its member states—which, crucially, includes the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA). There-
fore, Brexit raises significant challenges not only in the European dimension
but also on a global scale.
Moreover, there are indications that the United Kingdom would use the
opportunity of Brexit to attempt to create a particularly close trade relation-
ship with the United States.4 Although recent changes in U.S. international
trade policy may pose some questions on that trade strategy,5 this seems likely
to remain in the negotiating agenda in the medium and long term. Regardless
of timing, entering a U.S.-U.K. trade deal that covers procurement would also
impact the U.K. regulation of these markets. Given the close relationships be-
tween the European Union and the United States, this creates a sort of tri-
lemma. Any changes the United Kingdom may want to introduce to its pro-
curement regulatory and enforcement architecture will need to comply with
the likely demands of both the European Union and the United States. In
that regard, it seems both timely and necessary to assess the extent to which
Brexit actually creates an opportunity for significant regulatory reform.
1. European Council Guidelines Following the United Kingdom’s Notification Under Arti-
cle 50 TEU 1, EUCO XT 20004/17, 1 (2017), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/
press/press-releases/2017/04/29-euco-brexit-guidelines/ [https://perma.cc/2GT4-56YN] [here-
inafter European Council Guidelines]; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union
art. 50, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 43–44.
2. European Council Guidelines, supra note 1, at 5, 8.
3. PHEDON NICHOLAIDES ET AL., A NEW SETTLEMENT FOR THE UK: A “LEAP IN THE DARK” 8
(2016), available at https://www.coleurope.eu/system/files_force/research-paper/beep_39.pdf?
download=1 [https://perma.cc/W4HH-JXMK].
4. How “Brexit” Could Change Business in Britain, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2016/business/international/brexit-uk-what-happens-business.html?_r=0 [https://
perma.cc/QTC8-LSNC] (last updated Sept. 18, 2017).
5. THE PRESIDENT’S 2017 TRADE POLICY AGENDA 2, 3, available at https://ustr.gov/sites/
default/files/files/reports/2017/AnnualReport/Chapter%20I%20-%20The%20President%27s
%20Trade%20Policy%20Agenda.pdf [https://perma.cc/5C6V-NFR4].
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The extent to which a real possibility for procurement reform in the
United Kingdom exists crucially depends on the framework of the future
E.U.-U.K. trading relationship.6 A closely knit E.U.-U.K. trade agreement
covering procurement would likely result in the United Kingdom’s contin-
ued full compliance with E.U. rules. Nonetheless, this is not necessarily
guaranteed, and barring specific requirements in future free trade agree-
ments between the United Kingdom and the European Union or third coun-
tries, including the United States, the GPA seems to be the only regulatory
constraint with which future U.K. public procurement reform needs to fol-
low.7 However, the U.K. status and standing under the GPA is far from
clear, and GPA members may see Brexit as an opportunity to obtain new
concessions from both the United Kingdom and the European Union—
both in terms of scope of coverage or regulatory conformity. Further,
given the current trend of creating GPA plus procurement chapters in free
trade agreements, such as the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA),
the GPA regulatory baseline will gain even more importance as a benchmark
for any future reform of U.K. public procurement regulation, even beyond the
strict scope of the GPA’s coverage.8 Given the diversity of GPA-compliant
procurement systems, such as those used in the European Union and the
United States,9 the extent to which the GPA imposes significant restrictions
on U.K. public procurement reform is unclear.
In this context, this paper attempts to disentangle the multi-layered com-
plexities of Brexit and to explore the issues that Brexit created in interna-
tional public procurement regulation—both from the perspective of internal
E.U. law-related issues and broader external issues of international trade reg-
ulation. It also aims to assess the GPA baseline regulatory requirements and
to reflect on the impact these may have on post-Brexit U.K. public procure-
ment reform. This paper considers the process of untangling U.K. procure-
ment regulation from E.U. law as the first step in freeing the system from the
constraints derived from the current E.U. regulatory baseline. It then as-
sesses the possible opportunities and constraints derived from the U.K. par-
6. There are multiple scenarios that could be covered, such as the United Kingdom’s poten-
tial retention of access to the single market despite this not being part of the government’s strat-
egy or the United Kingdom’s membership of the European Economic Area (EEA), which is also
not currently on the cards. ROPES & GRAY, IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.K.’S BREXIT REFERENDUM 3–4
(2016), available at https://www.ropesgray.com/~/media/Files/alerts/2016/09/20160901_Brexit_
Alert.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8UJ-P7CP]. Both solutions would impose full compliance with ex-
isting (and future) E.U. public procurement rules (including their judicial interpretation at E.U.
level), which would render the discussion moot. See id. Therefore, those scenarios are not con-
sidered in any detail in this paper.
7. See Carlo Maria Cantore & Su¨bidey Togan, Public Procurement in the EU, in THE INTERNA-
TIONALIZATION OF GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT REGULATION 143, 160 (Aris C. Georgopulos
et al. eds., 2017).
8. Free Trade Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea,
Kor.-U.S., Mar. 15, 2012; id. art. 17.2.
9. Compare Council Directive 2014/24, art. 25, 2014 O.J. (L 94) 65, 109 (EU) (repealing Di-
rective 2004/18/EC) [hereinafter Directive 2014/24], with FAR 25.403.
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ticipation in the GPA—first assessing the U.K. current and post-Brexit po-
sition as a GPA party and then establishing a comparison between the Euro-
pean Union and the GPA regulatory baselines to identify the actual space for
substantive regulatory reform of U.K. procurement law post-Brexit in a
manner remaining compatible with international trade commitments. That
section also identifies areas of U.K. procurement regulation and practice
that could benefit from policy developments within both the E.U. and the
GPA regulatory baselines, which we submit would be more productive than
wasting policy-making and legislative efforts in any other areas. This paper
concludes with some reflections on the limited scope for significant reform
of the U.K. public procurement regime post-Brexit.
II. UNTANGLING U.K. PROCUREMENT REGULATION
FROM E.U. LAW
The E.U. public procurement market size is estimated at around fourteen
percent of GDP,10 or USD 2.31 trillion per year.11 As part of the E.U. single
market, public procurement within the European Union is subject to a set of
harmonization measures that shape how each member state may regulate its
public procurement markets.12 This regime imposes both negative and pos-
itive obligations. E.U. Directives, transposed into the member states’ na-
tional legal orders, significantly restrict their discretion to regulate public
procurement by establishing a common regulatory baseline.13 Some rules
derive from primary E.U. law—the EU treaties establishing the four funda-
mental freedoms of movement.14 These contain negative obligations, thus
foreclosing certain practices such as discrimination or unequal treatment
10. Public Procurement, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/
public-procurement_en [https://perma.cc/7XMM-E6NQ] (last updated Aug. 12, 2017).
11. See IMF World Economic Outlook Database, October 2016, INT’L MONETARY FUND, https://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2014&ey=2018&scsm=
1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&pr1.x=83&pr1.y=15&c=998&s=NGDPD&grp=1&a=1
[https://perma.cc/EP6D-CMPF] (last visited Aug. 16, 2017).
12. The Single Market aims to integrate the various national markets in a common European
market. Its legal basis is found in the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union,
art. 3, 26, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 17, 59. For a discussion on the Single Market, see
DAMIAN CHALMERS ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 674–711 (2d ed. 2010);
PAUL CRAIG & GRA´INNE DE BU´RCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 581–610 (5th ed.
2011); Kamiel Mortelmans, The Common Market, the Internal Market and the Single Market,
What’s in a Market?, 35 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 101 (1998); Christopher Bovis, The Regulation
of Public Procurement as a Key Element of European Economic Law, 4 EUR. L.J. 220, 220–29 (1998).
13. For a discussion of the purposes of European Union (EU) regulation in public procure-
ment, see Sue Arrowsmith, The Purpose of the EU Procurement Directives: Ends, Means and the Im-
plications for National Regulatory Space for Commercial and Horizontal Procurement Policies, in 14
CAMBRIDGE YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LEGAL STUDIES 1, 1–47 (Catherine Barnard et al. eds.,
2012); Sue Arrowsmith, The Past and Future Evolution of EC Procurement Law: From Framework
to Common Code?, 35 PUB. CONT. L.J. 337, 339 (2006); Berend Jan Drijber & He´le`ne Stergiou,
Public Procurement Law and Internal Market Law, 46 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 805 (2009).
14. See generally Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, art. 26, Oct. 26,
2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 59.
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that are detrimental to achieving an E.U. single market.15 In addition, sec-
ondary legislation under the form of Directives provides positive obligations,
such as European Union-wide advertisement of contract opportunities, mu-
tual recognition of documentary requirements, or specific and rather pre-
scriptive procedural rules.16
From a U.K. domestic constitutional perspective, E.U. law—both pri-
mary and secondary—constitutes a source of law resulting from the Euro-
pean Communities Act 1972 (ECA 1972)17 or as put by the U.K. Supreme
Court in the context of the recent Brexit litigation,
EU law enjoys its automatic and overriding effect only by virtue of the [ECA
1972], and thus only while it remains in force . . . . so long as that [ECA 1972]
remains in force, the EU Treaties, EU legislation and the interpretations placed
on these instruments by the Court of Justice [of the European Union] are direct
sources of UK law.18
Thus, as long as the United Kingdom remains a member of the European
Union, barring any unilateral repeal of the ECA 1972 that could wipe out
the internal effectiveness of E.U. law in the United Kingdom, E.U. law
will continue to enjoy this automatic and overriding effect, and the U.K. ju-
diciary and executive powers will remain bound to apply it.19
The current generation of public procurement Directives from 201420
(2014 Public Procurement Package) is composed of three directives: (1) Di-
rective 2014/23/EU (Concessions Directive),21 (2) Directive 2014/24/EU
(Public Sector Directive),22 and (3) Directive 2014/25/EU (Utilities Direc-
tive).23 Defense and security sector procurement is regulated by Directive
2009/81/EC,24 and flanking procedural rules establish minimum require-
ments for the domestic remedies systems in Directives 89/665/EEC25 and
92/13/EEC26 (both as amended by Directive 2007/66/EC27 and by Directive
2014/23/EU).28
Taken together, these Directives constitute the bulk of public procure-
ment regulation within the European Union, although the member states
15. Id. art. 36–37.
16. See Directive 2014/24, supra note 9, at 65, 109 (repealing Directive 2004/18/EC).
17. European Communities Act 1972, c. 68 (Eng.).
18. R v. Sec’y of State for Exiting the European Union, [2017] UKSC 5, [61] (N. Ir.).
19. Id.
20. For discussion of the reform process, see GRITH SKOVGAARD ØLYKKE & ALBERT SANCHEZ-
GRAELLS, REFORMATION OR DEFORMATION OF THE EU PUBLIC PROCUREMENT RULES (2016).
21. Council Directive 2014/23, 2014 O.J. (L 94) 1 (EU) [hereinafter Directive 2014/23].
22. Directive 2014/24, supra note 9, at 65.
23. Council Directive 2014/25, 2014 O.J. (L 94) 243 (EU).
24. Council Directive 2009/81, 2009 O. J. (L 216) 76 (EC).
25. Council Directive 89/665, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 33 (EEC).
26. Council Directive 92/13, 1992 O.J. (L 76) 1, 5 (EEC).
27. Council Directive 2007/66, 2007 O.J. (L 335) 1 (EC).
28. Even if the general discussion below applies to the entirety of the 2014 Public Procure-
ment Package, the bulk of the detailed analysis in this paper will be limited to the substantive
rules of Directive 2014/24/EU and the remedies rules after their reform by Directive 2007/
66/EC.
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are free to regulate areas that are not covered, such as contracts with a value
below the financial thresholds that trigger compliance with the E.U. rules.29
One consequence of the U.K. exit from the European Union is the pos-
sibility for the United Kingdom to reform its regulation of public procure-
ment, which thus far, mostly is limited to the rules arising from E.U. law.30
The United Kingdom has traditionally followed a “copy-out approach” to
the transposition of E.U. Directives31—resulting in a number of domestic
statutory instruments that, by and large, replicate the E.U. rules’ structure
and content. In its extreme, the possibility for regulatory reform deriving
from Brexit could allow for the United Kingdom to move away from the cur-
rent statutory architecture. Potentially, the United Kingdom could decide
not to regulate public procurement at the statutory level at all, provided
that other regulatory methods (such as policy directions and administrative
practices) allowed the United Kingdom to meet the requirements of the
United Nations Convention Against Corruption32—which requires a signa-
tory party “in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system,
[to] take the necessary steps to establish appropriate systems of procurement,
based on transparency, competition and objective criteria in decision-making,
that are effective, inter alia, in preventing corruption.”33
29. On thresholds, see Pedro Telles, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: The EU’s Internal Market,
Public Procurement Thresholds, and Cross-Border Interest, 43 PUB. CONT. L.J. 3, 7, 8 (2013); Pedro
Telles, Public Procurement Financial Thresholds in the EU and Their Relationship with the GPA, 11
EUR. PROCUREMENT & PUB. PRIV. PARTNERSHIP L. REV. 205, 205 (2016); Piotr Bogdanowicz,
Cross-Border Interest and Concession Contracts: A Critical Approach, 10 EUR. PROCUREMENT &
PUB. PRIV. PARTNERSHIP L. REV. 83, 83 (2015).
30. For extended discussion, see SUE ARROWSMITH, THE LAW OF PUBLIC AND UTILITIES PRO-
CUREMENT: REGULATION IN THE EU AND UK 11-235 (3d ed. 2014).
31. See Albert Sanchez-Graells, The Implementation of Directive 2014/24/EU in the UK, in 8
EUROPEAN PROCUREMENT LAW SERIES (Edward Elgar ed.) (forthcoming), available at https://
ssrn.com/abstract=2947939 [https://perma.cc/ZT4G-8SWG]; HM GOV’T, TRANSPOSITION
GUIDANCE: HOW TO IMPLEMENT EUROPEAN DIRECTIVES EFFECTIVELY 28 (2013).
32. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST
CORRUPTION, art. 9 (2004), available at https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/
Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf [https://perma.cc/89KX-XA88].
33. Id. The minimum requirements of an Art. 9(1) UNCAC are further specified in the sense
that its Parties must ensure that:
Such systems, which may take into account appropriate threshold values in their applica-
tion, shall address, inter alia: (a) The public distribution of information relating to procure-
ment procedures and contracts, including information on invitations to tender and relevant
or pertinent information on the award of contracts, allowing potential tenderers sufficient
time to prepare and submit their tenders; (b) The establishment, in advance, of conditions
for participation, including selection and award criteria and tendering rules, and their publi-
cation; (c) The use of objective and predetermined criteria for public procurement decisions,
in order to facilitate the subsequent verification of the correct application of the rules or pro-
cedures; (d) An effective system of domestic review, including an effective system of appeal, to
ensure legal recourse and remedies in the event that the rules or procedures established pur-
suant to this paragraph are not followed; (e) Where appropriate, measures to regulate matters
regarding personnel responsible for procurement, such as declaration of interest in particular
public procurements, screening procedures and training requirements.
Id.
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However, the wide range of possibilities for reform likely is to be constrained
beyond this very minimum standard by the U.K. interest in securing a free trade
agreement with the European Union.34 Needless to say, Brexit has not altered
the U.K. economy (although there are increasing inflationary pressures), and
the United Kingdom will continue needing to import from and to export to
E.U. markets.35 In 2016, “[a]bout [forty-four percent] of U.K. exports in
goods and services went to other countries in the EU,” and fifty-three percent
of imports into the United Kingdom came from other E.U. countries.36 Indeed,
it is the U.K. government’s objective to have “an ambitious and comprehensive
Free Trade Agreement” with the European Union; it is arguable that it may
cover public procurement.37 It is also possible for regulatory areas to include
public procurement among those where the United Kingdom and the European
Union may decide to retain current rules on a reciprocal basis.38 As the U.K.
government has indicated, the future agreement
may take in elements of current Single Market arrangements in certain areas as it
makes no sense to start again from scratch when the UK and the remaining Member
States have adhered to the same rules for so many years. Such an arrangement would
be on a fully reciprocal basis and in [the UK’s and the EU’s] mutual interests.39
Thus, it seems likely that, after Brexit, U.K. procurement regulation may
to some extent continue to be constrained or at least heavily influenced by
E.U. law. Further constraints derive from the U.K. interest in retaining ac-
cess to liberalized international procurement markets in terms of the GPA or
other FTAs.40
This paper proceeds on the assumption that the United Kingdom will re-
tain some form of regulation of public procurement. This section explores
the extent to which E.U. law likely is to continue to constrain and/or influ-
ence U.K. procurement regulation. It assesses two key legal milestones in the
Brexit process as currently envisaged: (1) the proposed Great Repeal Bill,
which will enshrine E.U. law as national law in the United Kingdom,41
34. Dep’t for Exiting the European Union, Policy Paper: The United Kingdom’s Exit from, and
New Partnership with, the European Union, Gov.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/the-united-kingdoms-exit-from-and-new-partnership-with-the-european-union-
white-paper/the-united-kingdoms-exit-from-and-new-partnership-with-the-european-union-2
[https://perma.cc/6XHM-GNXD] (last updated May 15, 2017).
35. Id.
36. Amy Sippitt, Everything You Might Want to Know About the UK’s Trade with the EU, FULL
FACT (Aug. 15, 2017), https://fullfact.org/europe/uk-eu-trade/ [https://perma.cc/37ZR-J9P9].
37. HM GOV’T, THE UNITED KINGDOM’S EXIT FROM AND NEW PARTNERSHIP WITH THE EURO-
PEAN UNION 35 (2017) [hereinafter UNITED KINGDOM’S EXIT], available at https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/589189/The_United_Kingdoms_
exit_from_and_partnership_with_the_EU_Print.pdf [https://perma.cc/CB7T-9ZYP].
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See infra Part IV. DEP’T FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE, PREPARING FOR OUR FUTURE UK
TRADE POLICY, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/preparing-for-our-future-uk-trade-
policy [hereinafter PREPARING FOR OUR FUTURE TRADE].
41. DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, LEGISLATING FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM’S
WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION 12 (2017) [hereinafter LEGISLATING FOR THE UNITED
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and (2) a prospective U.K.-E.U. free trade agreement to regulate their trade
relationships after Brexit. International legal constraints beyond those of
E.U. law are discussed later in the paper.
A. Great Repeal Bill or the Continuation of “EU-Derived” Procurement Law
in the United Kingdom
In March 2017, the U.K. government published a policy paper, known as
the Great Repeal Bill White Paper, detailing how it would deal with the legal
uncertainty from the country’s departure from the European Union. The gov-
ernment subsequently published the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill (com-
monly known as the Great Repeal Bill) that—after receiving Parliamentary ap-
proval and becoming an Act of Parliament—will repeal the ECA 1972 and
convert E.U. law into U.K. law at the time of Brexit.42 Repealing the ECA
1972 is a logical, and needed, step since it contains the Parliamentary assent
to the country being an E.U. member state and gives effect to E.U. law.43
The immediate consequence of repealing the ECA 1972 is the disappearance
from the U.K. legal order of over forty years of acquis44 arising from E.U. law,
including the bulk of the rules governing the country’s public procurement.45
To avoid a legal cliff edge and allegedly provide legal clarity and certainty,
the government decided to convert E.U. law into national law at the time
Brexit occurs.46 This does not mean importing all E.U. legal sources but in-
stead (1) selectively converting directly applicable E.U. law (E.U. Regulations
and an occasional Directive), (2) preserving existing U.K. regulatory instru-
ments implementing E.U. law (such as the Public Contracts Regulations
2015),47 (3) determining what rights in the E.U. treaties will be kept, and
(4) giving historic Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) case law
the same binding effect as that of decisions from the U.K. Supreme Court.48
KINGDOM’S WITHDRAWAL], available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/604516/Great_repeal_bill_white_paper_accessible.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5UZX-Z5BB].
42. Id. At the time of writing (Oct. 23, 2017), the Bill is being considered at the U.K. Parlia-
ment. See European Union (Withdrawal) 2017-19 Bill, http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2017-
19/europeanunionwithdrawal.html.
43. European Communities Act 1972 c.68 (Eng.).
44. By acquis we mean the accumulation and evolution of the body of E.U. law composed of
treaties, secondary legislation, and decisions from the Court of Justice since 1957. The acquis is
monitored particularly in the context of the expansion of the EU via accession of new member
states. For background, see Acquis, EUR. COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/acquis_en [https://perma.cc/W2MP-RRNJ] (last updated
June 12, 2016).
45. However, the extent to which E.U. law has been conflated with the common law, through
judicial activity over this period, and whether it would be possible to roll back the United King-
dom’s legal order to an E.U.-free state pre-dating the United Kingdom’s accession to the then
European Communities remains an academic question.
46. See generally LEGISLATING FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM’S WITHDRAWAL, supra note 41, at 12.
47. Public Contracts Regulations 2015 (SI 2015/102) (Eng.).
48. LEGISLATING FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM’S WITHDRAWAL, supra note 41, at 14.
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These legal instruments will become known as “E.U.-derived law.”49 The main
purpose of the Great Repeal Bill is thus ensuring—regardless of the formal
source of law—that the substantive content and enforceability of E.U. law re-
mains untouched, unless and until, Parliament decides to introduce future reg-
ulatory reforms.50
The U.K. approach is prone to legal uncertainty irrespective of the gov-
ernment’s assurances. “Copying and pasting” E.U. law into the national legal
order will not magically make it compatible with E.U. law. For example, re-
cent advances in electronic cross-border public procurement integration
(European Single Procurement Document51 and e-Certis52) are available
only to E.U. and European Economic Area member states.53 These are
not available to third countries—which the United Kingdom becomes on
Brexit day—unless there is a free trade agreement in place on that date.54
Moreover, the Commission’s Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/7 estab-
lishing the standard form for the European Single Procurement Document,
a directly applicable E.U. legal source, will be incorporated into the U.K.
legal order without making any sense.55
Come Brexit day, the Great Repeal Bill will keep the validity of the
current transposition of public procurement Directives.56 As such, the
following instruments and their Scottish equivalents57 will not disappear
from the legal order: (1) Public Procurement (Amendments, Repeals and
Revocations) Regulations 2016,58 (2) Utilities Contracts Regulations 2016
(transposing Directive 2014/25/EU),59 (3) Concession Contracts Regula-
tions 2016 (transposing Directive 2014/23/EU),60 (4) Public Contracts Reg-
ulations 2015 (transposing Directive 2014/24/EU),61 (5) Defence and Secur-
49. Id. Note that the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill may alter the terminology to “EU-
retained law.”
50. Id.
51. See PEDRO TELLES, THE EUROPEAN SINGLE PROCUREMENT DOCUMENT 2, 3 (2017), avail-
able at https://www.urt.cc/sites/default/files/UrT_2017-1_Telles.pdf [https://perma.cc/MN38-
HJ63] (discussing European Single Procurement Document).
52. European Single Procurement Document and e-Certis, EUR. COMMISSION, ec.europa.eu/
growth/single-market/public-procurement/e-procurement/espd_en [https://perma.cc/Z3NW-
AHP7] (last updated Aug. 13, 2017). In addition, the Brexit Negotiation Taskforce published
a position paper on public procurement on September 7th requiring and guaranteeing the
United Kingdom’s access to e-Certis on a “legacy” basis for those procurement procedures al-
ready running when the United Kingdom departs the Union.
53. Id. Access may be made available to GPA parties in the future, since the current GPA
Agreement predates these legal provisions.
54. Id.
55. Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/7, 2016 O.J. (L 3) 16.
56. LEGISLATING FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM’S WITHDRAWAL, supra note 41, at 13.
57. Scotland is the only of the three devolved U.K. administrations with regulatory powers
over public procurement that extend to the transposition of E.U. law into Scottish law. See Pub-
lic Contracts (Scotland) Regulations 2015 (SSI 2015/446).
58. Public Procurement (Amendments, Repeals and Revocations) Regulations 2016 (SI 2017/
275) (Eng.).
59. Utilities Contracts Regulations 2016 (SI 2016/274) (Eng.).
60. Concession Contracts Regulations 2016 (SI 2016/273) (Eng.).
61. Public Contracts Regulations 2015 (SI 2015/102) (Eng.).
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ity Public Contracts Regulations 2011 (transposing Directive 2009/81/EC),62
and (6) Public Contracts (Amendment) Regulations 2009 (transposing Direc-
tive 2007/66/EC).63
Consequently, the majority of public procurement rules derived from
E.U. law will remain unaffected. The government must then decide how
to evolve the legal procurement framework, as with any other E.U.-derived
law.64 Depending on the existence or not of an E.U.-U.K. free trade agree-
ment covering public procurement, the scope for change may be bigger or
smaller. If such agreement does not exist, at the very least, existing legislation
will have to be adapted to purge references to E.U. processes and institu-
tions. For example, Regulation 51 of the Public Contracts Regulations
2015 establishes the rules on the form and manner of sending notices for
publication at E.U. level; once Brexit happens, U.K. contracting authorities
simply will not have access to the E.U. publications office.65
The Great Repeal Bill White Paper does not fully address the issue of CJEU
case law.66 It mentions that existing case law will have the same value as that
coming from the Supreme Court—effectively giving the latter scope to de-
viate from CJEU rulings in the future as it sees fit.67 As for CJEU decisions
after Brexit, they will simply have no binding force in the country, making
them no different from any other source of E.U. law.68 In consequence, it
is not hard to foresee a progressive divergence on the interpretation and ap-
plication of E.U.-derived law by the Supreme Court in comparison with the
CJEU’s interpretation and application of E.U. law. This is problematic due
to the declaratory nature of CJEU case law69 and certainly an issue that will
require significant fine-tuning during the Brexit negotiations—not least due
to the European Union’s stated objective of preserving the jurisdiction of its
Court of Justice.70
As far as the Great Repeal Bill and E.U.-derived law are concerned, from
the moment of Brexit, there appear to be no limitations on how the United
Kingdom may decide to re-shape its procurement regulation.71 The possibil-
62. Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations 2011 (SI 2011/1848) (Eng.).
63. Public Contracts (Amendment) Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/2992) (Eng.).
64. Steve Peers, As Bad As It Gets: the Whitepaper on Brexit, EU LAW ANALYSIS (Feb. 3, 2017),
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2017/02/as-bad-as-it-gets-white-paper-on-brexit.html?m=1
[https://perma.cc/DZ69-ENE8].
65. Public Contracts Regulations 2015 (SI 2015/102), ¶ 51 (Eng.).
66. Steve Peers, The Whitepaper on the Great Repeal Bill: Invasion of the Parliamentary Control
Snatchers, EU LAW ANALYSIS (Mar. 31, 2017), http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2017/03/
the-white-paper-on-great-repeal-bill.html?m=1 [https://perma.cc/W5TR-55ED].
67. LEGISLATING FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM’S WITHDRAWAL, supra note 41, at 14.
68. Michael Ford, The Great Repeal Bill, Workers’ Rights, Henry VIII and the ECJ, UNIV. BRIS-
TOL L. SCH. BLOG (Apr. 4, 2017), http://legalresearch.blogs.bris.ac.uk/2017/04/the-great-repeal-
bill-workers-rights-henry-viii-and-the-ecj/ [https://perma.cc/6B46-VA5J].
69. Id.
70. Which is, indeed, one of the core principles of the European Union’s Brexit negotiating
guidelines. European Council Guidelines, supra note 1, at 3.
71. Panos Koutrakos, What Does Brexit Mean for the UK in WTO?, MONCKTON CHAMBERS
(July 12, 2016), https://www.monckton.com/brexit-mean-uk-wto/ [https://perma.cc/CSV8-543W].
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ity of reshaping remains open to debate, however, since the current legal re-
gime creates significant scope for adaptation of rules during transposition
and virtually no limitations on the regulation of contracts valued below-
thresholds.72 The scope for variation was not used for the transposition of
Directive 2014/24/EU,73 and for low-value contracts, there is some very lim-
ited regulation in Chapter 8 (Regulations 109-112) of the Public Contracts
Regulations 2015.74 Would there be real interest in spending political cap-
ital, time, and money significantly revising the rules? And if so, why? In com-
parison, Scotland has instead used its power to regulate public procurement
to provide a more substantial set of rules for contracts below thresholds.75
Having established that post-Brexit there may not be internal constraints
restricting the United Kingdom from potential reform of public procure-
ment regulation in a way that deviates from the E.U.-derived law as much
as considered appropriate, it is, however, worth stressing that those con-
straints may arise from the future E.U.-U.K. relationship.
B. U.K.-E.U. FTA or the Start and End of Procurement Reform in the
United Kingdom
As an E.U. member, the United Kingdom enjoys unrestricted access to the
E.U. single market and offers the other twenty-seven member states identical
access to its own national market.76 With the U.K. departure from the Euro-
pean Union, trade between both moves from internal to external (or interna-
tional), subject to a new regulatory agreement or the default of WTO
rules.77 Assuming the United Kingdom and the European Union are interested
in signing a FTA covering public procurement, such an agreement is likely to
foreclose major changes to the current U.K. public procurement regulation.
This can be explained by the European Union’s desire to limit the differences
between public procurement regimes associated with the block via trade agree-
ments. This perspective is clearly observable in the January 2016 E.U.-Ukraine
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), whereby Chap-
ter 8 establishes a set of rules regulating public procurement access.78
72. See Albert Sanchez-Graells & Pedro Telles, Regulation 25—Conditions Relating to the GPA
and Other International Agreements, PUB. CONT. REGS. COMMENT., http://pcr2015.uk/regulations/
regulation-25-conditions-relating-to-the-gpa-and-other-international-agreements/ [https://
perma.cc/LZ8N-TQKR] (last updated Sept. 5, 2016).
73. Albert Sanchez-Graells, Would a Brexit Significantly Change the Way the English Public Sec-
tor Buys Supplies and Services?, U. BRISTOL L. SCH. BLOG ( June 17, 2016), http://legalresearch.
blogs.bris.ac.uk/2016/06/would-a-brexit-significantly-change-the-way-the-english-public-
sector-buys-supplies-and-services/ [https://perma.cc/6AX7-XRSK].
74. See Sanchez-Graells & Telles, supra note 72.
75. Procurement Reform (Scotland) Act 2014, (ASP 12) §§ 3–4.
76. See BBA, BBA BREXIT QUICK BRIEF #1: STAYING IN OR LEAVING THE EU SINGLE MARKET 2,
available at https://www.bba.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/webversion-BQB-1-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HU5Y-99BN].
77. Id. at 4.
78. See EU-Ukraine Association Agreement art. 148, 2014 O.J. (L 161) 13, 71. This title con-
stitutes the DCFTA part of the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine. Id.
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E.U.-Ukraine DCFTA Article 148 states the agreement “provides for the
progressive approximation of the public procurement legislation in Ukraine
with the E.U. public procurement acquis”—leaving no doubt about which
legal system will have to change and adapt as to comply with the requirements
of the other.79 The E.U.-Ukraine DCFTA does not require a line-by-line im-
plementation of E.U. public procurement Directives in Ukraine, but does pro-
vide a clear indication that basic standards and practices should be similar.80 In
addition, the country is under the obligation of working toward legislative ap-
proximation with the E.U. acquis.81 The agreement also requires Ukraine to
keep up with the evolution of the E.U. acquis, including CJEU case law and
implementing measures adopted by the European Commission.82
While it is true that the United Kingdom currently complies with E.U.
public procurement rules—and as such, there is currently no issue of stan-
dards or compatibility between both regimes—any substantial U.K. legal re-
form could soon break that compatibility.83 Moreover, such deviation would
be less politically acceptable than differences between the European Union’s
and Ukraine’s (or third countries’) domestic rules for the simple fact that,
while in the latter case such differences pre-exist the cooperation relation-
ship, in the U.K. case, such differences would be created ex novo.84 A direc-
tion of travel away from regulatory convergence would, thus, be prone to
trigger more resistance. For example, if the United Kingdom decided that
contracting authorities would be completely free to design their own proce-
dure or even take away any limitations on the grounds for negotiations,85
it would clearly make the country’s legal framework incompatible with the
European Union’s and thus, be in breach of an agreement similar to the
E.U.-Ukraine DCFTA.86
The compatibility requirement(s), particularly the need to accept the ju-
risdiction of the CJEU that is to be set aside according to the Brexit White
Paper, make it very unlikely that from a political perspective, the United
Kingdom would be willing to settle for a FTA similar to that of Ukraine.87
As such, it seems implausible that the United Kingdom would be able to
achieve a comprehensive free trade agreement with the European Union
covering public procurement.
79. Id.
80. Id. art. 151.
81. Id. art. 152, 153.
82. Id. art. 153.
83. Koutrakos, supra note 71.
84. Id.
85. Sue Arrowsmith, The Implications of Brexit for Public Procurement Law and Policy in the
United Kingdom, 1 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 1, 32 (2017).
86. EU-Ukraine Association Agreement art. 148, 2014 O.J. (L 161) 13, 71.
87. UNITED KINGDOM’S EXIT, supra note 37, at 13. It would also make it similar in its downsides
to the EEA and “EEA-minus” models put forward by SUE ARROWSMITH, IP/A/IMCO/2017-27,
CONSEQUENCES OF BREXIT IN THE AREA OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 23–27, 51–56 (2017) [hereinafter
ARROWSMITH, CONSEQUENCES OF BREXIT].
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Lesser alternatives available for a E.U.-U.K. free trade agreement might
provide a wider scope for reform. For example, the proposed Chapter on
public procurement currently being negotiated in the E.U.-Indonesia free
trade agreement is much lighter in terms of compatibility requirements
and makes no mention of the CJEU’s jurisdiction.88 On a similar note,
Chapter 10 of the current E.U.-Singapore free trade agreement—clearly in-
spired and based on GPA provisions—also provides significant scope for dif-
ferences between the two procurement regimes.89
In addition to the above, we believe that due to the pre-existing relation-
ship between the European Union and the United Kingdom, as well as the
nature of those other countries the European Union has signed free trade
agreements with (i.e., developing countries), there is only a limited likeli-
hood the European Union would agree to a “looser” procurement regime.
Studies highlighting the limited openness of the U.K. procurement system
under the current best case scenario from a perspective of a legal framework
convergence compound this opinion.90
Leaving for now the European perspective, and to assess external con-
straints that would be relevant even in the absence of a U.K.-E.U. free
trade agreement (or precisely in that event), the remainder of this paper
will concentrate on an assessment of the international trade law constraints
to the future (potential) reform of U.K. public procurement regulation and,
notably, on the GPA. To begin with, we will consider the changing U.K. sta-
tus under the GPA as a result of Brexit. We will then assess the constraints
derived from a GPA regulatory baseline, as compared with the tighter E.U.
constraints discussed so far.
III. WHITHER UNITED KINGDOM’S GPA MEMBERSHIP?
The GPA is a plurilateral agreement within the WTO framework to
which members can accede.91 Of relevance for our discussion, the European
88. Trade Negotiations Between the EU and Indonesia: EU Proposal on Public Procure-
ment, Explanatory Note 2017, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/
february/tradoc_155293.pdf [https://perma.cc/VAY2-SGUX].
89. Free Trade Agreement Between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore,
EU-Singapore, June 29, 2015, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/
september/tradoc_151729.pdf [https://perma.cc/CY27-USR8]. However, the Court has just
found this agreement to be a mixed agreement, requiring the ratification by thirty-eight national
and regional Parliaments. Opinion C-2/15, EU:C:2017:376, May 16, 2017, available at http://
curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf?doclang=EN&text=&pageIndex=0&part=
1&mode=req&docid=190727&occ=first&dir=&cid=28849 [https://perma.cc/JR22-6L5X].
90. Zornitsa Kutlina-Dimitrova & Csilla Lakatos, Determinants of Direct Cross-Border Public
Procurement in EU Member States, CHIEF ECONOMIST NOTE, July 2014, at 1, 9; EUROPEAN COM-
MISSION, FINAL REPORT: CROSS-BORDER PROCUREMENT ABOVE EU THRESHOLDS 41 (2011);
STRAND, RAMADA, AND CANTON, PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN EUROPE: COST AND EFFECTIVENESS
96 (2011).
91. General Overview of WTOWork on Government Procurement, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/overview_e.htm [https://perma.cc/96SR-YN8H] (last
visited May 12, 2017) [hereinafter General Overview].
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Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom are currently covered by
this agreement. Presently, E.U. public procurement law ensures U.K. com-
pliance with the GPA—primarily through the equal treatment provision of
Article 25 of Directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement92 as transposed
into U.K. domestic law by regulation 25 of the Public Contracts Regulations
2015.93 Additionally, Directive 2014/24/EU and the rest of the 2014 E.U.
Public Procurement Package were drafted with the explicit aim of ensuring
substantive compliance with the GPA.94 It is generally assumed as uncontro-
versial that the E.U. public procurement system complies with the GPA, and
that, consequently, the U.K. transposition of those rules also ensures compli-
ance with the GPA.95 The current version of the agreement (Revised GPA)
establishes harmonized rules regulating bilateral access to procurement mar-
92. Directive 2014/24, supra note 9, at 65, 68. Art. 25 reads:
In so far as they are covered by Annexes 1, 2, 4[,] and 5 and the General Notes to the Eu-
ropean Union’s Appendix I to the GPA and by the other international agreements by which
the Union is bound, contracting authorities shall accord to the works, supplies, services[,] and
economic operators of the signatories to those agreements treatment no less favourable than
the treatment accorded to the works, supplies, services[,] and economic operators of the
Union.
Id. at 109. A similar provision in Article 43 of Directive 2014/25/EU on utilities procurement en-
sures compliance with commitments in that field. Council Directive 2014/25, 2014 O.J. (L 94),
243, 298 (EU). Finally, compliance with obligations concerning works concessions under Annex 6
is ensured by means of Directive 2014/23, supra note 21, at 2. It is worth noting that the revised
scope of coverage of the GPA entered into force in April 2014 (i.e., after Directive 2014/24/EU,
supra note 9, was adopted in February of the same year). In the 1994 version of the GPA, the cov-
erage was structured in five annexes plus general notes. See generally Agreement on Government
Procurement, 8 n.1, available at https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gpr-94_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RN3H-A8NW] [hereinafter Agreement on Government Procurement]. In the
revised 2011 version (effective 2014), the coverage was reorganised in seven annexes, the last
being the general notes themselves. See generally Revised Agreement on Government Procure-
ment, art. 2, ¶ 4, available at https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/rev-gpr-94_01_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/VV3T-3W7V] [hereinafter Revised Agreement on Government Procurement].
This should be taken into account when reading the relevant provisions of the current E.U. public
procurement directives.
93. See Sanchez-Graells & Telles, supra note 72. This applies to England, Wales, and North-
ern Ireland. Albert Sanchez-Graells & Pedro Telles, Regulation 1—Citation, Commencement, Ex-
tent and Application, PUB. CONT. REG. COMMENT., http://pcr2015.uk/regulations/regulation-1-
citation-commencement-extent-and-application/ [https://perma.cc/82R2-TLJH] (last updated
June 2, 2016). The devolved administration of Scotland carried out a separate transposition
by means of the Public Contracts (Scotland) Regulations 2015 (S.I. 2015/446) (Scot.), and reg-
ulation 26 has the same content.
94. Recital (8) of the Dec. 20, 2011 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on Public Procurement, at 16, COM (2011) 896 final (Dec. 20, 2011) explicitly indicated
that “[f]or contracts covered by the [GPA], as well as by other relevant international agreements
by which the Union is bound, contracting authorities fulfil the obligations under these agree-
ments by applying this Directive to economic operators of third countries that are signatories
to the agreements.” The text has been amended in the final version and recital (17) of Directive
2014/24, supra note 9, at 68, now reads: “For contracts covered by . . . the GPA, as well as by
other relevant international agreements by which the Union is bound, contracting authorities
should fulfil the obligations under those agreements by applying this Directive to economic op-
erators of third countries that are signatories to the agreements” (emphasis added).
95. See Cantore & Togan, supra note 7, at 160; Ping Wang, Brexit and the WTO Agreement on
Government Procurement (GPA), 26 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 34, 37 (2017).
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kets,96 which we will analyze in detail in Section IV below. Before doing so,
we will look, instead, into the U.K. status as a party (or not) to the Revised
GPA. Due to the agreement’s plurilateral and optional nature, the U.K. sta-
tus is currently beyond unclear, although we posit that the United Kingdom
is not a member in its own right for the following reasons.
A. Is the United Kingdom Today a GPA Member in Its Own Right?
Its E.U. membership achieves the U.K. participation in the Revised
GPA.97 The European Union, representing all member states, acceded to
the Revised GPA in 2012, but the member states themselves are not parties
since the accession to this type of agreement is an exclusive E.U. competence
under Article 3(1)(e) and (2) TFEU.98 Furthermore, the United Kingdom
was not a party in its own right to the Revised GPA 2012’s predecessor,
the GPA 1994.99 Although the United Kingdom did sign the agreement in
April 1994, it never actually submitted its ratification,100 benefiting instead
from the then European Community’s accession. There is considerable de-
bate over the consequences from Brexit to the U.K. status as a party to the
GPA because it is the first time a member state is departing the EU.101
There are two opposing perspectives: (1) that the United Kingdom is not
a GPA party on its own right and (2) that it is.
The first school of thought argues that the United Kingdom currently is
not a member in its own right.102 Effectively this means the country will no
longer be a party once it leaves the European Union—leading to an imme-
diate loss of access to the procurement markets of all GPA parties.103 This
loss of access, of course, cuts both ways, and other GPA parties would simul-
taneously lose access to the U.K. public procurement market since there
96. Government Procurement: Agreement on Government Procurement, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_gpa_e.htm [https://perma.cc/8PZX-TLA2]
(last visited May 10, 2017). On the Revised GPA see, BILLY A. MELO ARAUJO, THE EU DEEP
TRADE AGENDA: LAW AND POLICY 208–09 (2016).
97. The GPA “consists of 19 parties covering 47 WTO members (counting the EU and its
28 member states, all of which are covered by the Agreement, as one party).” Agreement on Gov-
ernment Procurement: Parties, Observers and Accession, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm [https://perma.cc/6VLE-L4P4] (last visited July 11,
2017) [hereinafter Agreement on Government Procurement]. “Another 29 WTO members and
four international organizations participate in the GPA Committee as observers. 10 of these
members with observer status are in the process of acceding to the Agreement.” Id.
98. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 3,
Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 51.
99. See generally Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 92. For details regard-
ing signatories, see Agreement on Government Procurement: Parties, Observers and Accessions,
WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm [https://
perma.cc/P7TB-Y6JT] (last visited July 3, 2017).
100. WORLD TRADE ORG., STATUS OF WTO LEGAL INSTRUMENTS 125 (2015). And it is pos-
ited that even if it wanted to, the United Kingdom would not be able to ratify it today. See
Wang, supra note 95, at 36–37.
101. See ARROWSMITH, CONSEQUENCES OF BREXIT, supra note 87, at 29–30.
102. Wang, supra note 95, at 36.
103. Id. at 34–37.
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would be no reciprocity agreement between the United Kingdom and any
GPA party. Having said this, the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 Regu-
lation 25 (“Conditions relating to the GPA and other international agree-
ments”) leaves open the question of what actually will happen:
In so far as they are covered by Annexes 1, 2[,] and 4 to 7 and the General Notes to
the EU’s Appendix 1 to the GPA and by the other international agreements by
which the EU is bound, contracting authorities shall accord to the works, supplies,
services[,] and economic operators of the signatories to those agreements treat-
ment no less favourable than the treatment accorded to the works, supplies, ser-
vices[,] and economic operators of the EU.104
At the time of transposing the E.U. Directive, this was the correct way to
address the access of undertakings based on other GPA parties to the pro-
curement markets of England and Wales because the country’s participation
in the GPA was achieved via its E.U. membership.105 The problem, how-
ever, arises once the United Kingdom leaves the European Union because
the text of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 would remain unaltered
and still make sense, at least, from a literal perspective—reducing the possi-
bility for it to be suppressed as a result of the European Union (Withdrawal)
Act without further Parliamentary intervention.106 Assuming the United
Kingdom is no longer a party to the GPA at the time of Brexit, it is arguably
illogical for the United Kingdom to keep such a provision without reciproc-
ity, but that does not change the fact that the provision would remain in
force and might even remain meaningful in a scenario whereby the European
Union and United Kingdom reach an agreement that gives E.U. undertak-
ings access to the U.K. public procurement market. In any case, it constitutes
another example of the pitfalls arising from the E.U.-derived law approach
taken in the Brexit White Paper.107
Conversely, another school of thought argues that the U.K. GPA position
post-Brexit is secure—based mostly on customary international law on the
succession of states to treaties and the practice under the GATT 1947.108
Neither of those arguments is particularly compelling in this setting due
to the specificity of the U.K. current position within the GPA and the nature
of the European Union itself, which, although a contracting party, it is not a
state.109
104. Public Contracts Regulations 2015 (SI 2015/102) ¶ 25 (Eng.).
105. Also, explicitly acknowledged in Regulation 2 of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015,
with reference to the Council Decision 2014/115, 2014 O.J. (L 68) 1 (EU), which consubstanti-
ates the entry into force in the EU of the Revised GPA and “to which the text of the Protocol is
attached (at OJ No L 68, 7.3.2014).” Public Contracts Regulations 2015 (SI 2015/102) ¶ 2
(Eng.).
106. Id.
107. See supra Part II.A.
108. Lorand Bartels, The UK’s Status in the WTO After Brexit 3 (Sept. 23, 2016) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Public Contract Law Journal).
109. See id.
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As for the state succession argument, while it is true that longstanding
customary law on state succession exists, most of it is based on pure interna-
tional treaty succession, whereby a new state emerges where a prior existed
and succeeds on its international obligations.110 First, the U.K. E.U. depar-
ture is not a traditional state succession: neither the European Union is a
state itself nor is the United Kingdom a new one, so any use of the concept
of state succession in international treaties needs to be adapted. Second, the
nature of the Revised GPA makes the situation even more complex since this
is not a free standing international treaty but a plurilateral agreement con-
tained within the WTO’s legal framework.111 As Lorand Bartels recognizes,
state succession within the membership of international organizations has a
mixed record.112 There are varied examples of practice within the GATT
1947, i.e., the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953 and 1963,
Czechia and Slovakia succession to Czechoslovakia in 1993 and, most re-
cently, Timor-Leste and Portugal.113 We perceive it a stretch to apply cus-
tomary law of state succession to what is not a traditional state succession
and within the legal framework of an international organization.
Overall, thus, it seems that the argument for international legal succession is
not as strong as it has been claimed.114 In consequence, and in light of the po-
tential for inflexibility from the European Union, we fear that the United King-
dom will not retain its status as a GPA member and will have to seek, if it de-
sires, a new accession.115 Such process will be conditioned by the U.K. position
110. United Nations, Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, 17
I.L.M. 1488, art. 15 (1978). On the limitations of the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of
States in Respect of Treaties as a source of international customary law, see Roda Mushkat,Hong
Kong and Succession of Treaties, 46 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 181, 181 (1997).
111. Bartels, supra note 108, at 18.
112. Id. at 19.
113. Id. at 19 nn.91–92. Regarding the examples of practice within the GATT 1947, such as
the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953 and 1963, and Czechia and Slovakia succes-
sion to Czechoslovakia in 1993, the same can be said. Id. Those constitute very different exam-
ples of state succession and it is quite challenging to consider that by themselves they would con-
stitute customary law of the treaties and provide the United Kingdom with a clear basis for
claiming party status to the GPA post-Brexit. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
case is by and large an issue of colonial succession in the GATT 1947, as per Article XXVI:5(c)
of the GATT 1947 and not a straightforward state succession. The fact that the UK Govern-
ment provided its own unilateral declaration in addition to the Southern Rhodesia’s one, can
be interpreted only in this context. Id. Bartels contends that a subsequent succession of the Fed-
eration of Rhodesia and Nyasaland by Southern Rhodesia in 1963 is another example of GATT
1947 practice at play that would be of use to the UK. Id. We do not follow the same line of
thought, since Southern Rhodesia was effectively recovering the status it lost in 1953. It is
one thing for a former party to “succeed its successor,” another for a non-party to succeed a cur-
rent party. Id. The Czechoslovakia GATT 1947 succession in 1993 by Czechia and Slovakia also
does not back up the claim that the United Kingdom will retain its current status and in fact,
constitutes an example of the opposite. Both countries submitted their own applications to
the GATT and even though they kept Czechoslovakia’s rights and obligations, they have
done so following an accession process and not a succession one. Id.
114. See Wang, supra note 95, at 37.
115. ARROWSMITH, CONSEQUENCES OF BREXIT, supra note 87, at 48–49. On the cost-benefit
analysis of GPA participation, see Wang, supra note 95, at 37–42.
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underWTO law more generally, but this paper will restrict the ensuing analysis
to GPA accession stricto sensu, on the assumption that the United Kingdom re-
tains WTO membership despite the need to renegotiate its terms.116
B. Will the UK Be Subject to a Full Accession Process?
A WTO member may initiate the process of joining the GPA by assuming
the position of observer in preparation to submit its offer.117 The actual acces-
sion is done by the submission of an offer, which includes the coverage of en-
tities and contracts and constituting the Appendix I offer or coverage offer.118
If applicable, this process brings considerable difficulties to the United King-
dom. There is no precedent of such a compliant potential party seeking acces-
sion to the GPA.119
It is conceivable the U.K. access to the GPA follows one of three broad
pathways. First, the United Kingdom wants to keep its current commitments,
and all GPA parties120 agree that the United Kingdom should be able to keep
the current E.U. coverage and schedules so as not to disrupt the existing GPA
balance. If that is the case, then there is effectively no change for any GPA
party: the EU27 + UK commitments will be identical as they were before
Brexit, making the change in coverage notification under Art. XIX of the
GPA a mere formality.121 There would be some transitional issues since the
United Kingdom would be out of the GPA while the accession process
runs, but there is no reason why it could not be done relatively quickly; espe-
cially bearing in mind, the U.K. current procurement legislation is already
GPA compliant, assuming it is not changed post-Brexit in a way that breaks
such compliance.122 It is important to anchor expectations though; even a
quick accession, like New Zealand’s in 2015, took three years.123
116. See Koutrakos, supra note 71.
117. See Committee on Government Procurement, Decision on Procedural Matters Under the
Agreement on Government Procurement (1994), WTO DOC. GPA/1, Annex 1-2 (Mar. 5, 1996).
118. Christopher Yukins & Johannes Schnitzer, GPA Accession: Lessons Learned on the Strengths
and Weaknesses of the WTO Government Procurement Agreement, 7 TRADE L. & DEV. J. 89, 94
(2015).
119. Since international trade agreements remain an exclusive E.U. competence, it is unlikely
that the country will be able to obtain GPA observer status during the withdrawal process. Even
if it does, the United Kingdom surely cannot submit a formal Appendix I offer for consideration.
In other words, the United Kingdom will only be able to start its accession process once Brexit
happens. On that date, the United Kingdom will be out of the GPA, even though it may or may
not be bound to grant market access to the undertakings of GPA members under its current na-
tional rules. Wang, supra note 95, at 47–48.
120. Currently the agreement has forty-seven members, including the E.U. and its twenty-
eight member states, and there are ten observers in the process of accession. Agreement on Gov-
ernment Procurement, supra note 97.
121. Wang, supra note 95, at 47–48, is of a similar opinion, although with a more cautious
view on the probability of other parties demanding compensation or re-negotiation; ARROW-
SMITH, CONSEQUENCES OF BREXIT, supra note 87, at 32.
122. Wang, supra note 95, at 37.
123. See Johannes S. Schnitzer, Expanding the Membership of the WTO Government Procurement
Agreement: Montenegro and New Zealand Ratifying the Revised GPA, 5 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV.
NA185, NA187 (2015).
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Second, the United Kingdom does not want to keep its current schedules
and decides to propose its own—possibly using the current E.U. commitments
as a starting point.124 If that is the case, then a full accession process will be
required for the parties to negotiate and eventually accept the U.K. offer.125
Once this Pandora’s box is open, it is hard to predict where and when the
negotiations will actually end, and theorizing on the likelihood of rational/
emotional negotiations within the GPA is beyond the scope of this paper. Fur-
thermore, it is unlikely that recent accessions to the GPA, such as that of New
Zealand, can provide us with much information relevant for this scenario.126
This scenario includes further uncertainty because the European Union
would be under the obligation to submit a change of schedules/coverage as re-
quired by Article XIX of the Revised GPA, potentially leading to consultation
or arbitration with one or more of the existing parties.127
The final accession scenario assumes the United Kingdom will want to fully
renegotiate its schedule of coverages—perhaps along the lines of a GPA plus
model128 or modeled after existing trade agreements that cover procurement
in more detail, such as the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
(CETA) between the European Union and Canada.129 In terms of accession
process, the implications are similar to the prior scenario, i.e., full accession
needed but with added uncertainty and scope for negotiation delays.
In consequence, if the first scenario happens, the U.K. accession should be
reasonably straightforward and most of the obstacles are procedural rather
than substantive, although it will take time. If, on the other hand, the United
Kingdom tries to deviate from the status quo, the more likely result is that
the accession will end up looking as a fresh accession, implying long and pro-
tracted negotiations with the other GPA parties.
IV. GPA BASELINE REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS: WHAT SCOPE
FOR UK REFORM OUTSIDE OF THE E.U.?
Despite the difficulties surrounding the U.K.’s post-Brexit status under
the GPA and the fact that the Brexit White Paper does not mention the
GPA in its section on the U.K. WTO membership,130 it seems clear that
the U.K. government will aim to secure GPA coverage to support its future
124. See Wang, supra note 95, at 45–46.
125. On the details of the process and documents required, see General Overview, supra note
91, and Yukins & Schnitzer, supra note 118, at 94.
126. On New Zealand’s accession, see Schnitzer, supra note 123, at NA185–88.
127. Wang, supra note 95, at 47–48.
128. ARROWSMITH, CONSEQUENCES OF BREXIT, supra note 87, at 56–61.
129. See generally Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement Between Canada, of the
One Part, and the European Union and Its Member States, of the Other Part, Can.-E.U.,
Sept. 14, 2016, 2016/0206 (NLE), available at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/
ST-10973-2016-INIT/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/KQ27-YQ7J].
130. UNITED KINGDOM’S EXIT, supra note 37, at 56.
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international trade strategy.131 Barring regulatory constraints derived from
free trade agreements with the European Union or third countries, the
GPA seems likely to remain the only regulatory baseline with which a
post-Brexit U.K. public procurement reform would need to conform
with.132 Further, given the current trend of creating GPA plus procurement
chapters in free trade agreements, such as the U.S.-Korea FTA,133 the GPA
regulatory baseline will gain even more importance as a benchmark for any
future reform of public procurement regulation in the United Kingdom,
even beyond the strict scope of coverage of the GPA.
Given the more limited scope and prescriptiveness of the GPA as compared
with the 2014 E.U. Public Procurement Package, this can be viewed as:
a significant opportunity for better regulation, which should be based on a single
and simple approach for all regulated procurement with more flexible procedures;
and, indeed, the opportunity that the GPA-based approach presents in this regard
provides a strong argument for the UK to opt for such an approach if it is realis-
tically available.134
Regardless of whether this is likely in the short term,135 the practitioner
community is also interested in exploring avenues for regulatory reform.136
However, enthusiasm about the opportunities created by a GPA-based re-
form is not necessarily the majority view,137 with arguments to the effect
that “[a]ccession to the GPA would necessitate the implementation of a re-
gime all but indistinguishable from that in the EU.”138 Therefore, there is a
clear need to further this debate and to assess the extent to which a GPA-
compliant reform of U.K. public procurement regulation would likely result
in a significantly different regulatory landscape.
With all the caveats that a complex process such as Brexit requires, it
seems that the possibility of creating a lighter new regulatory regime for
public procurement likely will remain on the legislative agenda.139 However,
131. PREPARING FOR OUR FUTURE TRADE, supra note 40, at 7; see ARROWSMITH, CONSEQUENCES
OF BREXIT, supra note 87, at 9.
132. Generally, for an in-depth analysis of the current version of the GPA, see THE WTO
REGIME ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT: CHALLENGE AND REFORM (Sue Arrowsmith & Rob-
ert D. Anderson eds., 2011).
133. Robert D. Anderson et al., Regional Trade Agreements and Procurement Rules: Facilitators or
Hindrances?, in THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT REGULATION 56, 73
(Aris Georgopoulos et al. eds., 2017).
134. Arrowsmith, supra note 85, at 4.
135. See ARROWSMITH, CONSEQUENCES OF BREXIT, supra note 87, at 10.
136. See, e.g., Victoria Moorcroft, Brexit: The End of Public Procurement Rules or Business as
Usual?, BIRD & BIRD ( June 8, 2017), https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2016/uk/
brexit-end-of-public-procurement-rules [https://perma.cc/P87V-LATL].
137. See generally Robert Breedon, UK Procurement Law After Brexit, MONDAQ, http://www.
mondaq.com/x/571352/Government+Contracts+Procurement+PPP/UK+Procurement+Law
+After+Brexit [https://perma.cc/RE59-Z49X] (last updated Feb. 24, 2017).
138. Michael Bowsher, Procurement Law After Brexit?, PUB. SECTOR BLOG (Mar. 16, 2016),
http://publicsectorblog.practicallaw.com/procurement-law-after-brexit/ [https://perma.cc/
LK9H-SKPZ].
139. Id.
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it is difficult to foresee whether procurement reform will be a priority post-
Brexit or if trade negotiations with the European Union and third countries
will exclude this possibility by imposing additional requirements in the con-
text of an FTA or otherwise. While we are skeptical of the will and ability to
pursue reform,140 in this section, we will assume that a reform of the U.K.
public procurement system founded on the GPA baseline of regulatory re-
quirements is politically possible and legally feasible.141 Indeed, if and
when the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 are reformed, continued com-
pliance with the GPA will need to be at the core of the process.142
Thus, this section briefly recalls the substantive constraints that derive
from the GPA as a regulatory baseline and assesses the extent to which dif-
ferent aspects of current U.K. public procurement law could be suppressed
or significantly altered in a GPA-compliant form.143 Given the U.K. copy-
out approach to the transposition of the current E.U. public procurement
rules,144 most considerations concerning the compatibility of reforms of
the U.K. system in light of the GPA would also apply to potential future re-
forms of E.U. public procurement law itself. The analyses in this and the fol-
lowing section will also serve to flesh out the broader point that sophisticated
(or minimalistic) principles-based procurement regulation can result in both
regulatory convergence or divergence across jurisdictions but that the trade-
facilitation goal of the GPA (and of future U.K. FTAs) is likely to push for
significant technical convergence145—which, ultimately, raises important
questions about the desirability and practicality of reforming the U.K. public
procurement regime post-Brexit.
A. GPA Principles-Based Regulation: Scope for Regulatory Diversity
The current version of the GPA adopts a hybrid regulatory technique and
specifies both general principles (notably, of non-discrimination/equal treat-
140. And we have repeatedly doubted it. See, e.g., Sanchez-Graells, supra note 73; Pedro
Telles, Simplification for Whom?, TELLES.EU (Mar. 28 2017), http://www.telles.eu/blog/2017/3/
28/simplification-for-whom [https://perma.cc/P5QG-XA2M].
141. We also assume that such reform would be possible at any point in time—and thus avoid
the complicated timing question of whether any reform of the U.K. system would need to be in
place for the purposes of assessment of GPA-compliance at the point of accession. See discussion
supra Part III. Or such reform would otherwise be susceptible to challenge if the United King-
dom decided to move from the current E.U.-based rules (assumed to be retained for the pur-
poses of expediting GPA accession) to a new regime once its GPA membership is confirmed.
Wang, supra note 95, at 37. This timing issue does not seem to affect the substantive analysis
because there is no scenario in which the United Kingdom could adopt a non-GPA compliant
procurement regime without facing severe consequences.
142. See Wang, supra note 95, at 37, 40.
143. See Arrowsmith, supra note 85, at 21–27.
144. Sanchez-Graells, supra note 31.
145. See Christopher R. Yukins, US Government Contracting in the Context of Global Public Pro-
curement, in THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT REGULATION 265, 265
(Aris Georgopoulos et al. eds., 2017) (stressing the point of technical convergence and its impact
on international procurement markets and the development of best practices in procurement
around the globe).
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ment)146 and detailed procedural requirements,147 geared toward the forma-
tion of public contracts,148 with which domestic public procurement regula-
tion by GPA signatories must comply.149 Due to this minimalistic and hy-
brid principles-based approach to procurement regulation,150 the GPA
creates significant space for regulatory diversity among its members.151 It
is generally seen as solely creating minimum standards based on interna-
tional best practices152 that are in themselves insufficient to create a fully
operative regulatory framework and must rely on further regulatory elements
at the domestic level.153 This derives, in good measure, from the need for
significant flexibility if the GPA is to secure expanded membership in the
146. On the scope of such obligation, see Kamala Dawar, The Government Procurement Agree-
ment, the Most-Favored Nation Principle, and Regional Trade Agreements, in THE INTERNATIONALI-
ZATION OF GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT REGULATION 111, 111 (Aris Georgopoulos et al. eds.,
2017); Kamala Dawar, Government Procurement in the WTO: A Case for Greater Integration, 15
WORLD TRADE REV. 645, 649 (2016); see also Arwel Davies, The National Treatment and Exceptions
Provisions of the Agreement on Government Procurement and the Pursuit of Horizontal Policies, in THE
WTO REGIME ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 429, 432 (Sue Arrow-
smith & Robert D. Anderson eds., 2011).
147. Robert D. Anderson & Anna Caroline Mu¨ller, The Revised WTO Agreement on Govern-
ment Procurement (GPA): Key Design Features and Significance for Global Trade and Development 10
(World Trade Org., Working Paper No. ERSD-2017-04, 2017), available at https://www.
econstor.eu/handle/10419/152257 [https://perma.cc/D633-ELU3].
148. That is, there are no rules concerning contract execution, except for the anticircumven-
tion prohibition to modify contracts in a way that avoids compliance with GPA obligations. Re-
vised Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 92, art. 15, ¶ 7.
149. It is worth noting that some of the detailed procedural rules are, in turn, qualified by
general or principles-based elements, such as the need to apply requirements proportionately
and in ways that do not create unnecessary obstacles to international trade. This is in common
with the first principles of most public procurement systems. See United Nations Comm’n on
Int’l Trade Law, Preamble to UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement 3 (2014),
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/procurem/ml-procurement-2011/2011-Model-Law-
on-Public-Procurement-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQ6A-ZNZP]; see also Caroline Nicholas,
Work of UNCITRAL on Government Procurement: Purpose, Objectives and Complementarity with
the Work of the WTO, in THE WTO REGIME ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT: CHALLENGE
AND REFORM 746, 754 (Sue Arrowsmith & Robert D. Anderson eds., 2011).
150. Cf. Sue Arrowsmith, The Revised Agreement on Government Procurement: Changes to the Pro-
cedural Rules and Other Transparency Provisions, in THE WTO REGIME ON GOVERNMENT PROCURE-
MENT: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 285, 287 (Sue Arrowsmith & Robert D. Anderson eds., 2011)
(considering that the GPA could still go beyond its current approach in pursuing a principles-
based system).
151. Or, in other words, “[e]xpressed in an exaggerated manner, markedly divergent national
laws could all be non-discriminatory and therefore of limited concern under the GPA.” Arwel
Davies, The Evolving GPA: Lessons of Experience and Prospects for the Future, in THE INTERNATION-
ALIZATION OF GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT REGULATION 23, 23, 27–28 (Aris Georgopoulos et al.
eds., 2017).
152. See generally Anderson & Mu¨ller, supra note 147, at 10; Bernard Hoekman, International
Cooperation on Public Procurement Regulation, in THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF GOVERNMENT
PROCUREMENT REGULATION 568, 568 (Aris Georgopoulos et al. eds., 2017).
153. This is true both in relation to monist and dualist jurisdictions and goes beyond the issue
of the availability of remedies for the direct enforcement of the GPA, which is resolved in
Revised Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 92, art.18, ¶ 1(b). On this point
of the interaction between the GPA and domestic regulatory regimes (as supported by the
UNCITRAL Model Law), see generally Nicholas, supra note 149, at 747–48.
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future.154 However, even in its current form, the GPA contributes to regu-
latory convergence between its parties.155 By creating a common substantive
core, it can be seen as an important catalyzer of further technical harmoni-
zation among GPA members,156 as well as third countries—not least, due to
the use of the GPA as a blueprint for procurement chapters in FTAs.157
Overall, other than in relation with very detailed rules concerning notices
and time periods, most of the GPA requirements are rather general in nature
and mainly seek to create a significant level of ex ante transparency (to foster
international competition and cross-border trade), as well as ex post reporting
(to inform renegotiations of the agreement on the basis of the procurement
that actually results on cross-border trade), and a rather basic core of substan-
tive requirements aimed at operationalizing the general principles of transpar-
ency, non-discrimination and equal treatment, competition, impartiality, and
proportionality—all of which, but particularly the two latter, are targeted at
controlling the discretion of procuring entities.158 These requirements must
be amenable to control through review procedures oriented at preserving
the suppliers’ opportunities to participate in the procurement.159
From this perspective, it seems clear that the United Kingdom would
need to do nothing to ensure GPA conformity of its current procurement
rules.160 However, if it decided to introduce post-Brexit reforms and move
away from the E.U. regulatory baseline, it would need to avoid creating
GPA compliance gaps.
B. GPA-Compliant UK Procurement Reform: What to Keep and What to Ditch?
A general comparison of the regulatory constraints derived from the GPA
and from E.U. public procurement law shows that their main differences de-
rive from the more detailed level of regulation provided by the E.U. re-
gime.161 Therefore, compliance with E.U. law ensures compliance with
154. Recital 4 of the revised GPA indeed stresses that “the procedural commitments under
this Agreement should be sufficiently flexible to accommodate the specific circumstances of
each Party.” Revised Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 92, Preamble.
155. See Christopher R. Yukins & Steven L. Schooner, Incrementalism: Eroding the Impedi-
ments to a Global Public Procurement Market, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 529, 568–70 (2007); Caroline
Nicholas, UNCITRAL and the Internationalization of Government Procurement Regulation, in
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT REGULATION 86, 87 (Aris Georgo-
poulos et al. eds., 2017).
156. Yukins, supra note 145, at 264–65; Christopher R. Yukins, International Protection of Free
Trade in Procurement Under NAFTA’s Chapter 10 on Public Procurement: The Pathway from
NAFTA to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement to a Potential European-U.S. Transatlantic
Trade & Investment Partnership, inTRANSNATIONAL LAW OF PUBLIC CONTRACTS 107, 108 (Mathias
Audit & Stephan W. Schill eds., 2016).
157. See Anderson et al., supra note 133, at 58.
158. See Anderson & Mu¨ller, supra note 147, at 10.
159. Revised Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 92, art. 18.
160. See Anderson & Mu¨ller, supra note 147, at 17.
161. Michael Steinicke, Government Procurement—Can the WTO Learn from the EU Regime?,
in LIBERALISING TRADE IN THE EU AND THE WTO 360, 368 (Sanford E. Gaines et al. eds., 2012).
However, note that a direct comparison of both regulatory baselines can be problematic because
some of the elements that can be seen as highly prescriptive under E.U. law derive from the
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the GPA, and in some sense, it can be considered that E.U.-compliant states
have gone beyond the GPA requirements.162 Thus, the United Kingdom can
identify in Brexit an opportunity to retrace some of the steps taken down the
road of stringent procurement regulation and to move away from what is
perceived as an excessively constraining standard.163
However, this does not seem a desirable direction of travel. It should be
borne in mind that GPA accession and membership generally triggers as-
pects of regulatory convergence and the development of domestic rules
along international best practices.164 From this perspective, a move by the
United Kingdom (or any other GPA member) toward a significant deregula-
tion of public procurement, based on a departure from a more prescriptive
(and, for the purposes of this argument, possibly more stringent) E.U. base-
line toward a less prescriptive GPA baseline, could be problematic in itself.
Unless the new rules were perceived (by other GPA members) to provide
closely comparable procedural guarantees and protections, such a move
could trigger claims of GPA infringement—or else, such approach may at
least increase the likelihood of rejection of the U.K. offer if the country is
subject to a GPA accession process, as seems likely.165
Beyond those tactical issues and concentrating on aspects of substantive
regulation where there is divergence between the E.U. and GPA regulatory
baselines, it is worth noting that it has been suggested that the main advan-
tages of moving from an E.U.-compliant to a GPA-compliant U.K. procure-
ment system would be allowing for a number of fundamental changes in the
shape of the legal procurement framework of the country.166 For example,
contracting authorities could reduce red tape through the creation of man-
datory registries of qualified economic operators or allowing negotiations
at all stages of the procurement procedure. It has also been suggested that
the remedies regime could be rolled-back to the minimum requirements
CJEU case law, most of which have been consolidated into the successive generations of E.U.
rules. See id. at 384. Conversely, the GPA has given rise to extremely limited interpretive deci-
sions by either the Committee on Government Procurement (Art XXI) or the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body. Id. at 383–84. Moreover, both regulatory sets are embedded in different reg-
ulatory systems (WTO law and E.U. law), and this can introduce further complications in their
direct comparison. See id. at 368.
162. See id.
163. Wang, supra note 95, at 37.
164. Anderson & Mu¨ller, supra note 147, at 10.
165. See supra Part IV.A. In our opinion, it should be stressed that there is a relatively intan-
gible element in the assessment of regulatory reform that pivots around the thrust of the GPA
requirements and links more generally to international public law duties of good faith as in-
cluded in United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, No.
18232, art. 26, and to a certain extent in UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra
note 35, art. 9. In that regard, a move away from a current system of (high) procedural safe-
guards and guarantees toward a regulatory framework that provided less assurance of compli-
ance with the main principles underpinning the GPA, could be open to challenge—not only po-
litically, but also legally, for example, in the GPA access negotiations the United Kingdom will
have to undertake, or if after accession, on a dispute before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.
166. See Wang, supra note 95, at 46.
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that applied before the revision carried out by the European Union in
2007.167
Contrary to that assessment, in our view, the claim that a transition from
current compliance with the E.U. regulatory baseline to a GPA-compliant
reformed procurement system would bring a significant opportunity for oth-
erwise unattainable improvements in the U.K. public procurement system
may be overstated and instead reflect a criticism of the E.U. public procure-
ment system at the margins.168 We do not view the current E.U. system as
perfect, and there are certainly areas where it can be further improved. How-
ever, those are not necessarily the areas mentioned above. In those areas,
current E.U. rules may be less constraining than it seems or encapsulate ad-
vances in regulatory harmonization that are desirable from the perspective of
freer international trade in public procurement markets—as well as on the
basis of their embedded market integrative logic. This applies in good mea-
sure to all suggested areas for improvement as a result of a move from an
E.U.-compliant to a GPA-compliant regulation of procurement in the United
Kingdom.169 The following sub-sections address specific issues where U.K.
reform would be based on a shift from E.U. to GPA baseline and provide
our views on their unnecessariness or undesirability. We also provide a list
of issues where we consider that setting a new regulatory baseline and invest-
ing policy reform efforts would provide larger gains.
1. Qualification: Rethinking the List Regime
E.U. law largely prevents member states from operating procurement sys-
tems based on closed lists.170 Member states can only require registration for
economic operators of their own jurisdiction, as well as for those of third
countries—but of operators from other E.U. jurisdictions, and registration
is not necessarily acceptable for those operators from GPA members, as
this could be challenged on the basis of the obligation of equal treatment re-
sulting from Article 25 of Directive 2014/24/EU.171 Overall, the restrictions
derived from E.U. rules mean that contracting authorities need to be able to
assess tenderers’ suitability at selection stage on the basis of equivalent means
167. See Arrowsmith, supra note 85, at 25–26. For details on those reforms, see Jane
Golding & Paul Henty, The New Remedies Directive of the EC: Standstill and Ineffectiveness, 3 PUB.
PROCUREMENT L. REV. 146, 146–47 (2008).
168. Other issues raised by Arrowsmith refer exclusively to the domestic interpretation of EU
requirements by the U.K. courts, in particular in relation to the principle of transparency and its
implications. Arrowsmith, supra note 85, at 23–24. In our view, there is no indication whatsoever
that the U.K. courts could adopt a different interpretation under the homonymous (if not iden-
tical) principle of transparency under the GPA and, in any case, this seems to reflect issues with
the unpredictability (or contestability) of judicial interpretation of general principles, which
seems inherent to all procurement systems. Therefore, we do not discuss this issue in any further
detail.
169. See Wang, supra note 95, at 46.
170. Council Directive 2014/24, art. 25, 2014 O.J. (L 94) 65, 109 (EU).
171. Directive 2014/24, supra note 9, at 109.
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of proof, as well as recognize equivalent certificates from bodies established
in other E.U. member states.172
Considering this position excessively restrictive, a suggestion has been
made to reduce red tape for procuring entities by requiring the use of a reg-
istration system of qualifications as a mandatory condition for participation
and as the basis for selecting participants.173 In our view, it is not clear that
this does not encapsulate an inadvertent trade-off of (theoretical) administra-
tive costs against losses in competition for public contracts. In fact, if one
were to design a system with stealthy cross-border barriers, this would be
a good way to do so. In general, it seems that avoiding registration require-
ments can facilitate cross-border participation by economic operators as, and
when, they are interested in specific tender opportunities—without the need
to have a pre-established administrative capability in any given jurisdic-
tion.174 That is why, under the E.U. rules, member states cannot require
registration of economic operators from other member states to participate
in a public tender.175
Functionally, the E.U. approach does not seem too different from the
GPA obligation to carry out the same type of assessment in relation with
multi-use lists under Art IX:10, which can be applied by analogy to the ad-
ministration of registration or qualification systems, in particular due to the
obligation under GPA Art IX:3—according to which GPA members and
their “procuring entities . . . shall not adopt or apply any registration system
or qualification procedure with the purpose or the effect of creating unnec-
essary obstacles to the participation of suppliers of another Party in its pro-
curement.”176 In our view, it seems likely that the imposition of an absolute
obligation of registration or certification prior to the participation in a ten-
der procedure will be interpreted as a significant restriction—particularly in
view of the generally accepted position that registration systems can amount
to a significant non-tariff barrier to trade in procurement markets.177
172. Steve Brunning, Cabinet Office Provides Advice to Contracting Authorities: Public Services
(Social Value) Act 2012, 22 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. NA84, NA84, NA86 (2013).
173. See U.K. Dep’t for Bus., Energy & Indus. Strategy, Property Ownership and Public Con-
tracting by Overseas Companies and Legal Entities: Beneficial Ownership Registration, GOV. UK
(Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/property-ownership-and-public-
contracting-by-overseas-companies-and-legal-entities-beneficial-ownership-register [https://
perma.cc/QKV8-N64N]. Or any other sort of mandatory pre-screening of suitability and re-
sponsiveness, such as lists of approved economic operators.
174. Rhodri Williams, The European Single Procurement Document, 25 PUB. PROCUREMENT L.
REV. NA69, NA70 (2016).
175. Directive 2014/24, supra note 9, art. 64, ¶ 7.
176. Agreement on Government Procurement, World Trade Organization (Mar. 30, 2012),
Art. 9(3).
177. Julien Gourdon et al., OECD Taxonomy of Measures Affecting Trade in Government Pro-
curement Processes, OECD TRADE POLICY PAPERS NO. 198, at 9–10 (2017), available at http://
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Therefore, it seems arguable that a GPA-compliant registration system
must operate in such a manner as not to preclude the participation of suppli-
ers based on their lack of previous registration, unless in normal conditions,
they are given sufficient time to register prior to the submission of offers. If
this is the case, then both the E.U. and the GPA systems result in the same
functional regulatory demands from a contracting authority seeking to ben-
efit from the establishment of a registration or qualification system. More-
over, giving up the advantages of mutual recognition of certificates within
the European Union would create an additional administrative burden for
U.K. suppliers, and in this case, it is hard to assess whether the net effect
of the reform would be positive. This seems to go against the grain of facil-
itating technical convergence in the areas of exclusion and qualitative selec-
tion of economic operators and could result in a very formalistic policy that
reduces effective competition for public contracts and, in the end, the possi-
bilities for U.K. public buyers to obtain value for money.178 Thus, in our
view, this is not an area where a move from an E.U. to a GPA regulatory
baseline necessarily creates scope for the development of an alternative desir-
able system.
2. Negotiation: Much Ado About Nothing
A second area where a shift from E.U. to GPA baseline has been stressed
focuses on the scope for negotiations.179 Generally, it has been considered
that E.U. rules impose significant restrictions on negotiations and that a
more flexible approach is possible under the GPA.180 In our view, however,
it is unclear whether a move away from E.U. requirements would allow for
greater use of procedures involving negotiations.181
Despite the fact that the 2014 E.U. Public Procurement Package aimed to
provide additional flexibility to procedures involving negotiations, there is a
view that the lack of clarity of the specific rules allowing for the use of those
procedures may create reticence on the part of contracting authorities—
particularly given the traditionally restrictive approach taken by the CJEU
to the interpretation of those grounds.182 However, in our view, that does
not mean that the revised EU rules actually restrict the possibilities to use
178. Id.
179. Steinicke, supra note 161, at 372.
180. Id.
181. That is, for negotiations without the constraints of the unclear grounds foreseen in Di-
rective 2014/24, supra note 9, art. 26. For discussion of the issues that arise from the reform of
the grounds for the use of different procedures involving negotiations in Directive 2014/24/EU
and for a general discussion on the European Union’s use of competitive procedures and nego-
tiations, see Pedro Telles & Luke R. Butler, Public Procurement Award Procedures in Directive
2014/24/EU, inMODERNISING PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: THE NEW DIRECTIVE 131, 142–43 (Franc¸ois
Liche`re et al. eds., 2014). See also ALBERT SA´NCHEZ GRAELLS, PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND THE EU
COMPETITION RULES 272–80 (2d ed. 2015).
182. Adrian Brown, The Impact of the New Procurement Directive on Large Public Infrastructure
Projects: Competitive Dialogue or Better the Devil You Know?, 13 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 160,
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competitive procedures involving negotiations or that regulatory reform is
needed but rather, that any uncertainties surrounding the use of competitive
procedures can be sorted out through guidance and case law. There is no
reason why the United Kingdom could not provide such guidance to its con-
tracting authorities,183 although it is also clear that guidance issued by the
European Commission would be preferable.
A different but related issue concerns whether a move from the E.U. to a
GPA baseline would grant U.K. contracting authorities access to procedures
involving significant possibilities for negotiation after the final tender stage.
E.U. law prescribes this by the so-called ban on negotiations,184 but in prin-
ciple, it is permitted under the GPA (Art XII)—allowing for the use of ne-
gotiations not only when it has been indicated in the transparency notice
as part of the description of the procurement method to be used but also
“where it appears from the evaluation that no tender is obviously the most
advantageous in terms of the specific evaluation criteria set out in the notice
of intended procurement or tender documentation.”185
This is the point where the GPA baseline differs more markedly from the
E.U. rules, particularly if the GPA is interpreted as meaning that if the pro-
curement process had been described in the tender documentation as not in-
volving any negotiations whatsoever, the procuring entity can engage in ne-
gotiations anyway. Nonetheless, this possibility seems constrained by the
trigger of not being possible to (obviously) identify the most advantageous
offer. Either way, for reasons discussed elsewhere,186 it is not clear that
the possibility of engaging in negotiations after the final tender stage neces-
sarily is beneficial to the procuring entity in all, or most, situations.
Moreover, given the significant flexibility created by the rules on the mod-
ification of contracts during their term,187 which is not regulated in the GPA
beyond the anticircumvention clause of Art XV:7, there seems to be little
advantage in engaging in renegotiations after completing the tendering as
compared to engaging in contractual renegotiation during the execution
phase.188 The only advantage from a more flexible approach to negotiations
183. To date, the most it has done is provide a decision tree to help deciding on what pro-
curement procedure to use. See Crown Commercial Serv., Procurement Policy Note: Availability of
Procurement Procedures (Decision Tree), ACTION NOTE 12/15 ( July 30, 2015), available at https://
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/454417/PPN_12_15.
pdf [https://perma.cc/RY92-NNP7].
184. See Council Statement Concerning Article 7(4) of Council Directive 93/37/EEC of 14
June 1993, 1994 O.J. (L 111) 114. For a critical approach to the rule, see Kai Kru¨ger, Ban-on-
Negotiations in Tender Procedures: Undermining Best Value for Money?, 4 J. PUB. PROCUREMENT 397,
401–02 (2004).
185. Revised Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 92, art. 12.
186. See Telles & Butler, supra note 181, at 158; Pedro Telles, Competitive Dialogue in Spain,
in COMPETITIVE DIALOGUE IN EU PROCUREMENT 399, 418 (Sue Arrowsmith & Steen Treumer
eds., 2012); Pedro Telles, Competitive Dialogue in Portugal, in COMPETITIVE DIALOGUE IN EU
PROCUREMENT 370, 394–95 (Sue Arrowsmith & Steen Treumer eds., 2012).
187. See Directive 2014/24, supra note 9, art. 72.
188. Revised Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 92, art. 15, ¶ 7.
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at the end of the tendering phase could be in terms of preventing the forma-
tion of the contract altogether if the offers received at the end of the tender-
ing phase are not able to satisfy the procuring entity’s needs. However, in
that case, current E.U. rules allow for a cancelation of the original tender
and recourse to negotiations to avoid awarding the contract based on an un-
suitable tender;189 thus, negating another perceived substantive distinction
between the E.U. and GPA legal regime. Therefore, the differences between
both systems may be more formal than functional on this point. Overall, it
seems that a move from the E.U. to the GPA regulatory baseline would
have a limited impact on the use of negotiations in procurement and that
not much more flexibility could be gained.
3. Remedies: Procedural Measures and Money Damages
Another area of clear divergence in the level of prescriptiveness between
the GPA and the E.U. regulatory baselines concerns the requirements of the
remedies system.190 A move toward GPA compliance only would create
(1) scope for a reduction or suppression of the standstill and automatic sus-
pension requirements mandated by E.U. law; (2) scope for reconsideration of
the ineffectiveness of illegally awarded contracts; and (3) some room for
tweaking the heads of damages claims (i.e., removing damages for lost prof-
its).191 In our view, from the perspective of well-functioning and effective
remedies system designs, there are significant issues around the eventual ad-
vantages derived from the United Kingdom being able to create a remedies
system without mandatory standstill, automatic suspension, possibly no rules
on ineffectiveness of illegally concluded public contracts,192 and limited pos-
sibilities to claim damages.193 A regulatory context with weak procurement
review procedures hardly seems capable of providing reassurances to foreign
bidders,194 and this can potentially either lead to higher prices, due to the
increase in uncertainty and risk posed by a weak enforcement system, or
to lobbying by undertakings for the inclusion of stronger dispute settlements
mechanisms in future free trade agreements involving the United Kingdom.
In any case, such a reform of the U.K. system would represent a half step
back from the procedural guarantees currently ensured by the E.U. regula-
189. Directive 2014/24, supra note 9, art. 32, ¶ (2)(a). Unsuitable tenders are defined as “ir-
relevant to the contract, being manifestly incapable, without substantial changes, of meeting the
contracting authority’s needs and requirements as specified in the procurement documents.”
Public Contracts Regulations 2015 (SI 2015/102), ¶ 32 (Eng.).
190. Arrowsmith, supra note 85, at 13.
191. Id.
192. Cf. 12 ARIE REICH, INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC PROCUREMENT LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF IN-
TERNATIONAL REGIMES ON PUBLIC PURCHASING 310–11 (1999).
193. See Xinglin Zhang, Constructing a System of Challenge Procedures to Comply with the Agree-
ment on Government Procurement, in THE WTO REGIME ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT: CHAL-
LENGE AND REFORM 483, 494–95 (Sue Arrowsmith & Robert D. Anderson eds., 2011).
194. See Hoekman, supra note 152, at 578–80.
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tory baseline.195 This is important in relation with jurisdictions that offer ac-
cess to remedies on a strictly reciprocal basis,196 which may take issue with a
reduction of guarantees by the United Kingdom that already is at the bottom
end of the spectrum within the European Union. More generally, there is no
obvious advantage in freeing up the public sector from the checks and balances
provided by privately initiated litigation through procurement disputes—at
least not in the absence of a more developed public oversight infrastructure.
This would also be out of step with developments in more advanced procure-
ment regimes, and most recent free trade agreements,197 and could likely re-
duce the efficiency (and integrity) of the whole U.K. procurement system.198
Therefore, even if this aspect of regulatory reform would be possible under a
GPA baseline, we do not think it would be a welcome one.
4. A New Baseline for Evolving Procurement Practices
In our opinion, in contrast with the three sets of issues discussed so far,
there is significant scope for reform and improvement of the U.K. regulatory
regime within the current constraints of the E.U. regulatory baseline, which
would also fit in a GPA compliant U.K. system.199 Regulatory reform efforts
would be better invested in this direction. The remainder of this section,
thus, fleshes out some of the areas where we consider efforts could be
made to improve procurement practice in the United Kingdom without nec-
essarily requiring regulatory reform.
i. Evolving E-Procurement
To begin with, there is urgency in meeting the challenge of fully transi-
tioning to electronic procurement200 (which legally needs to take place by
195. See Hans-Joachim Priess & Pascal Friton, Designing Effective Challenge Procedures: The
EU’s Experience with Remedies, in THE WTO REGIME ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT: CHAL-
LENGE AND REFORM 511, 530–31 (Sue Arrowsmith & Robert D. Anderson eds., 2011).
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a model of limited access to remedies for undertakings from the EU/EEA, GPA or FTA/RTA.
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member-states [https://perma.cc/8HK5-XYVR]. This indicates that, for those countries that
make access to remedies conditional on reciprocity, the reduced standards eventually adopted
by the United Kingdom in the future may create difficulties. For details, see id.
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erential trade agreements] include extensive coverage commitments that are enforceable—
including through domestic bid-challenge type mechanisms.”
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2018201 but should be completed as soon as possible) and to capitalize on the
reduced administrative costs that can result from an effective use of dynamic
purchasing systems based on electronic catalogues and, more generally, on
the extensive use of electronic auctions where at all possible.202 It is also nec-
essary to develop and resource an effective training strategy that delivers the
skills upgrade necessary to manage and oversee a more sophisticated and
technologically challenging electronic procurement environment.
ii. Framework Agreements
It is also necessary to carry out an in-depth performance audit of the sev-
eral mechanisms in place for centralized and collaborative procurement. An-
ecdotal evidence shows that the use of framework agreements has not been as
effective or efficient as it could be and that public buyers sometimes face dif-
ficult decisions due to either the multiplicity of alternatives they could use
for the same procurement, e.g., due to the existence of both national and re-
gional frameworks for given supplies, or the absence of centralized or collab-
orative provision in other areas.203 A mapping exercise could help identify
these instances of either overlap or absence of mechanisms and contribute
to their rationalization. Simultaneously, that audit could focus on the specific
ways in which centralized and collaborative procurement has been carried
out and assess the extent to which a change in mechanisms, e.g., a migration
from framework agreements to dynamic purchasing systems, could also in-
crease the efficiency of these activities.
iii. Bid Rigging
Related to these operational issues around centralization and collaboration,
it would also be necessary to gain a better understanding of the impact that
these strategies are having on supply chains and on competitive structures in
different markets. A close analysis by the U.K. Competition and Markets Au-
thority, beyond their current activities in bid rigging in public procurement,
would be desirable. This analysis would also allow for a better understanding
of the level of SME access to public procurement and provide evidence on the
ways in which improvements in this area could be achieved—some of which
will likely be affected by the technological developments and migration to
full e-procurement mentioned above.
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iv. Oversight
Last, but not least, there are also important challenges concerning reme-
dies and access to an effective review of public procurement decisions, as well
as a strengthening of public oversight mechanisms. The creation of a special-
ized procurement appeals administrative tribunal should be explored in
detail. There are significant potential advantages in a system that allows
for a speedier, more transparent, and less costly review of public procure-
ment decisions than bringing cases to the High Court.204 This would also
reduce the scope for confidential settlements that can both impose a relevant
volume of unobservable costs on public buyers, as well as, deprive practition-
ers and society at large of an understanding of the practices and strategies
that are considered to run against the existing regulatory framework or
other commercial considerations.
This is only a short list of highly challenging issues that require attention
with or without Brexit. It is also a list of areas for potential improvement of
public procurement regulation that are not dependent, or not significantly
dependent, on higher-level trade-related regulatory decisions. Working on
these issues would be a way of avoiding Brexit-induced paralysis in public
procurement. Importantly, these would be compatible with both the E.U.
and the GPA regulatory baselines, and consequently, the results of such ef-
forts for procurement advancement and reform would not be dependent on
the currently highly uncertain outcome of trade negotiations.205
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the promise that some identify in Brexit as an opportunity for sig-
nificant reform of the U.K. public procurement system, there is very limited
scope for significant near-term legislative change.206 With the caveats that
the complexity of a process such as Brexit requires, the paper has identified
several constraints. From an internal perspective, even if the European
Union (Withdrawal) Act creates the appearance of granting the United
Kingdom a free hand for the (de)regulation of procurement, the conclusion
of a comprehensive free trade agreement with the European Union, such as
that sought by the U.K. government, would probably tend to perpetuate
U.K. compliance with E.U. rules or, at the least, create a significant con-
straint on the introduction of reforms that would imply regulatory diversity
between the United Kingdom and the European Union.207 A similar trend of
containment of (de)regulatory tendencies could derive from advances in the
development of a U.K.-U.S. trade relationship and, more generally, from
GPA-based procurement liberalization. It seems questionable that the
204. Arrowsmith, supra note 13, at 1–47.
205. See Steinicke, supra note 161, at 363–64.
206. See Wang, supra note 95, at 37.
207. See id.
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United Kingdom is currently a party to the GPA, and it will thus need to
seek access to the agreement in the future. As for what the accession process
might entail, it would appear it depends on how different the United King-
dom wants its commitments to be from the current E.U. ones, and how the
remaining parties will use the opportunity to extract concessions.
Ultimately, in substantive terms, the GPA baseline imposes no require-
ments dissimilar enough to the European Union’s to justify the political
and practical cost of carrying out reforms tending to (de)regulate procure-
ment in the United Kingdom in a manner that is significantly different
from current rules.208 On the contrary, a GPA compliant regime may have
less flexibility for reform than anticipated. Additionally, there is a range of
policy areas where U.K. procurement would benefit from significant policy
steers and further investment today, and this is possible without formal reg-
ulatory reform.209 Work in those areas (and most notably on a prompt and
full transition to e-procurement) fits within the current net of regulatory
constraints. Thus, we conclude that the discussion around a change of reg-
ulatory model for procurement in the United Kingdom post-Brexit may well
be an exercise in legal futility and that public interest would be best served by
ensuring continuation of the existing regulatory framework, a push for more
effective policy implementation, and a renewed effort for international tech-
nical cooperation.
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